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Hybridity in non-democratic states can be economic as well as political. Economic hy-
bridity is produced by the same kind of pressures that create political hybridity, but the
relationship between economic and political hybridity has not been as much studied
by political scientists. This article uses the concept of patrimonial capitalism to look at
economic hybridity, its stability and relationship to political hybridity. Using examples
from Russia and other former Soviet states it argues that economic hybridity is unstable
and that it has a potentially negative affect on political stability generally.
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The origin and fate of hybrid regimes have been
explained predominantly and widely as functions of
politics. Hybrid regimes are the result of a global political
event – the end of the Cold War. Their primary character-
istic is political and institutional; the adoption of the formal
architecture of liberal democracy, particularly elections, by
elites who are not prepared to accept the prospect of losing
power that free and fair elections necessarily create
(Levitsky &Way, 2010: 17–19). This latter characteristic also
determines their fate: hybrids seem to end – or areation, University of
ax: þ353 61 202572.
arch Center, Hanyang
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hasucceeded by new iterations of hybridity – through tran-
sition by election since elections throw into sharp relief the
gap between their constitutional and political natures.
However, hybridity often extends beyond politics. The end
of the ColdWar didmore than expose a raft of new states to
democratizing pressures, enable policy makers to make
democracy promotion a foreign policy priority, and make
democracy ‘the only game in town’ (Przeworski, 1991: 26).
Rulers who were forced to modify their closed political
systems were also forced by the same global forces and
agencies to modify their closed economic systems; the
market was ‘other game in town’ and ‘capitalism promo-
tion’ changed economic practice and development as much
as ‘democracy promotion’ changed politics.
The results of capitalism promotion have been no better
than those of democracy promotion: economic hybridity is
almost as common as political hybridity. The two often
overlap, although political hybridity and authoritarianism
do not always require economic hybridity as the existence
of open market economies in authoritarian polities shows.
Economic hybridity does seem to require political hybridity
or actual authoritarianism to develop and endure. Where
they develop at the same time – as has been the case in thenyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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dependent. The relationship between economic hybridity
and politics means that economic hybridity is both a form
of economic order and a part of the political order since it is
both structured by and structures political relationships.
Co-dependency of politics and economics means that a
crisis of one may become a crisis of the other.
Economic hybridity and its political effects have been
less studied than political hybridity by political scientists.
One of the few attempts made to conceptualize it on a par
with political hybridity is Oliver Schlumberger’s (2008)
analysis of ‘patrimonial capitalism’. This article seeks to
expand on Schlumberger’s paper by looking at cases of
patrimonial capitalism from the former USSR to argue that
the development of patrimonial capitalism has been
important for political stability, which here is taken as
equivalent to the degree that leaders are able to easily
reproduce their rule by ensuring the co-option of elites and
social passivity. It will be argued that patrimonial capital-
ism is inherently unstable because of its difﬁculty securing
growth and due to the tensions within it. It is only stable
under certain conditions, which will be outlined below.
Where it is stable it has provided – at least so far – for elite
co-option as well as for some degree of performance
legitimacy in post-Soviet hybrids, and has been able to
balance the demands of rapacious elite groups and resource
demands from ofﬁcials trying to discharge state functions.1
The latter is a main source of tension where economic and
political hybridity mix. Political hybridity creates rapacious
elite interests and at the same time enables social forces,
albeit weakly, to put demands on the state. Dealing with
this tension to create stability and political co-option of
elite and social groups is partly exogenous to patrimonial
capitalism, at least in post-Soviet cases. It is a product of
rent-generation from privatization, hydrocarbon revenues,
and foreign borrowing. Post-Soviet patrimonial capitalism
does not appear to be capable of generating stability from
economic growth itself without further reform, and this
reform is blocked by its own nature as a form of rapacious
political capitalism, very different to the ‘varieties of capi-
talism’ that exist in capitalist democracies (Ganev, 2009).2
This article concentrates on Russia, although reference
will be made to other post-Soviet cases where appropriate
to illustrate aspects of the in/stability of patrimonial capi-
talism in the region. There are two reasons for this1 On the importance of performance legitimacy for hybrid regimes in
general, and for post-communist regimes in particular, see Burnell (2006)
and Feklyunina and White (2011: 387).
2 See Lane and Myant (2007) and Myant and Drahokoupil (2011: 299–
302), for descriptions of how the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature is not
relevant to the case of most post-Soviet cases. Lane and Myant bracket
the post-Soviet economies together as ‘hybrid economies’, but do not
analyze them as a class. Myant and Drahokoupil brieﬂy (311–312)
describe post-Soviet economies as being either ‘oligarchic or clientelistic
capitalism’, ‘order states’ or ‘remittance- and aid-based economies’. All of
these are far from the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature. The ﬁrst has
some similarities to what is called patrimonial capitalism here, but the
idea is underdeveloped and there are no clear dividing lines between
what Myant and Drahokoupil call ‘oligarchic capitalism’ and the other
two forms of economy: an oligarchic capitalism or an ‘order state’ can rely
on remittances (as some deﬁnitions of rentier states would allow for).approach. First, emphasis is put on the Russian experience
because its experience is varied politically and economi-
cally so that it is possible to relate other post-Soviet cases to
its experience to illustrate points about their development.
Second, Russia is the central economic and political power
in the region and this creates pressures on it that demon-
strate most fully the tension that can exist within patri-
monial capitalism between resource distribution aimed
at elite co-option and resource accumulation for the
purposes of fulﬁlling state functions of social management
and security provision.
2. Patrimonial capitalism and its development in the
former USSR
Patrimonial capitalism is a form of neo-patrimonialism.
Neo-patrimonial systems are combinations of legitimating
practices and norms, combinations of forms of economic
practice and of political practice. In neo-patrimonial sys-
tems personal ties and relations are complemented,
complicated and sometimes conﬂicted by impersonal in-
stitutions that have some independent existence of indi-
vidual actors. These impersonal institutions are most
notably, but not exclusively, a bureaucratic state machinery,
the development of which pushes a part of the state away
from personal relations towards more enduring hierarchies
based on impersonalism; and market economic exchange,
which adds additional channels to wealth to the traditional
personalised access to resources through the machinery of
a state constructed around its leader(s). Neo-
patrimonialism is thus a non-democratic social and politi-
cal order that is made up of conﬂicting modes of organi-
zation and their legitimation rather than a particular
institutional, social or economic order (Erdmann & Engel,
2006; Médard, 1982).
Fig. 1 maps out the space that neo-patrimonialism oc-
cupies between personal and impersonal modes of social,
political and economic legitimation. Neo-patrimonial sys-
tems take different forms within this space according to
their combination of different legitimating principles. In
each corner of this space are four types towards which, and
according to material and other pressures, a neo-
patrimonial system may veer. A neo-patrimonial system
where bureaucratic impersonalismmerges with high levels
of political control of the economy will tend towards a
developmental state model where bureaucracy endeavours
to direct development (the top left of Fig. 1); where
bureaucratic impersonalism combined with market eco-
nomic regulation the tendency will be towards a less
directed developmental state with the bureaucracy acting
not as the director of investment decisions but facilitating
market relations through legal guarantees of property etc
(the top right of Fig. 1). Where both market and bureau-
cracy are weak the tendency will be to the traditional
patrimonialism that MaxWeber (1947: 622–649) originally
described (bottom left of Fig. 1), in which neo-patrimonial,
impersonal elements are very weak. Where personal
patronage is a key form of legitimation but mixes with
the market the tendency will be towards patrimonial
capitalism (bottom right of Fig. 1). It is this latter type
that interests us here.
Fig. 1. The neo-patrimonial space.
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1. Formal and informal rules (laws on the one had and
values and behavioural patterns on the other) are not
mutually supportive but work against one another, with
informal rules generally trumping formal ones;
2. The rule of law is weak so that property and contract
rights are secured best through personal connections,
the development of which is highly costly to ‘outsiders’;
3. There tend to be no, or weak, competition and trust
laws;
4. Transaction costs are high due to the costs of securing
rights within a formal framework that sets out rights but
probably does not protect them;
5. Highly proﬁtable economic sectors are controlled by
elite members, foreign intervention in such sectors is
constrained by weak property rights and high trans-
action costs;
6. The pace and nature of any reform serves elite interests
and these interests explain what reform can happen;
7. Political leadership is not subject to democratic
constraint. Personalistic relations dominate and where
this is the case a non-democratic polity may develop a
patrimonial capitalist system because of the peculiar
tension that can arise between formal and informal rules
(Schlumberger, 2008).
Patrimonial capitalism is thus illiberal both economi-
cally since it constrains competition by deforming the
market and undermining formal economic rights (such as
those to property), and politically, in that it requires the
erosion (at the least) of democratic governance to enable
informal rules to triumph over formal ones.
The combination of these featuresmakes it very difﬁcult
for a patrimonial capitalist system to either transition to a
liberal capitalist system or to achieve development. Moving
to liberal capitalism requires either a political break to
destroy patrimonial elite control over the economy or aneconomic change to introduce new actors powerful enough
to supplant elites and rewrite political and economic rules.
Such systems also have a tendency to resist change. Pres-
sure to reform is ﬁltered through domestic structures so
that when reform happens it takes forms and happens at a
speed that protects the power of domestic elites as
Schlumberger’s analysis of Arab states shows. This helps to
dull development, as reform cannot be successful. Devel-
opment is also further stymied because of obvious prob-
lems with trust, which limit willingness of domestic and
foreign investors to invest because of the high costs of
insuring property rights and contracts. Endemic corruption
also leads to loss of human and investment capital through
migration and capital ﬂight. An economy can still grow in
such circumstances if, for example, prices for its exports
rise, or if it imports capital, but development as economic
diversiﬁcation and the growth of new high value-added
sectors outside of elite control is very difﬁcult.
Patrimonial capitalism formed in the crucible of socio-
political change that developed from greater international
economic integration and the collapse of communism
(Schlumberger, 2008: 233–236). Greater international
economic integration, based, among other things, on the
spread of aid conditionality and neo-liberal economic
agendas and structural adjustment, changed the terms of
authoritarian political economy. Semi-autarkic economic
development in which authoritarian systems could gate-
keep and proﬁt from foreign economic relations became
harder to sustain as policies of liberalization were pushed
by international ﬁnancial institutions. Changes brought
about by economic liberalization did not always lead to
economic democratization, but they did change the ground
on which economic patronage and control were based.
Liberalization created the formal legal basis for more
market-based private enterprise as price controls were
weakened through commodiﬁcation and as direct state
control over economic activity was diluted by privatization.
The forced development of a formal basis of competitive
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hence political relations on which political stability rested.
However, exogenously sourced reformwas easy to subvert.
It often lacked a strong domestic constituency, faced col-
lective action problems, and was introduced piecemeal and
left incomplete. Reform was therefore generally partial,
begun, often with a ‘big bang’ of ‘shock therapy’, but then
compromised.
The origins of patrimonial capitalism in the former USSR
lay in its relative backwardness. The USSR did not manage
to achieve a transition from basic development – achieved
by the coerced diversion of resources from consumption to
investment – to development based on greater economic
efﬁciency and, high value-added good production. The
reasons for this are well-known: central planning and the
bureaucratic institutions that supported it, as well as party
management of the economy that focussed on short-term
goal fulﬁlment at the expense of economic restructuring,
combined to lock in the economic underperformance and
decline by making the economy inimical to change.3 The
Soviet developmental model began to fail as a result. Efforts
to revitalize it – Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms – were
unsuccessful, but did destroy central political institutions.
This opened up the possibility of importing reform from
abroad and connecting to the global economy. Therewas no
alternative popular economic platform to that proffered by
international ﬁnancial institutions; the collapse of
communismwas a rejection of central planning rather than
a positive commitment to an alternative socio-economic
model clearly deﬁned in policy-terms (Holmes, 1997;
Offe, 1996: 30–31; Urban, 1994). Moreover, communism’s
collapse did not alter either local elite structures or the
social relations that had grown up around daily economic
life. Political change in the centre of the Soviet polity out-
paced change in the economy generally (Rozman, 1992).
Russia and other post-Soviet states were thus politically,
but not socially, discontinuous in that they had to create
new polities albeit with old elites.
These elites were patrimonial in two ways. First, they
were members of networks of afﬁnity that had initially
developed to protect ofﬁcials from the vagaries of the
planned economy (Urban, 1985), but which had subse-
quently developed into parasitic machines for the private
accumulation of wealth and inﬂuence (Jowitt, 1983). Sec-
ond, their relationship to society at large was patrimonial
since Soviet communism had been a patrimonial system in
which rapid modernization from a peasant economic base
had served to create structures for co-option of new social
groups (as a neo-patrimonial system the USSR tended to-
wards the top left of the space deﬁned in Fig. 1).4 Unlike
many of its east European clients, the Soviet party-state had
never had to face strong independent social forces and
negotiate with them (Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, &3 On these problems, generally see Kornai (1992). For the intractability
of the Soviet economy see, inter alia, Hewitt (1988), Åslund (1989). On the
party and the economy see Rutland (1992).
4 On the USSR as a patrimonial system see inter alia Kitschelt et al.
(1999: 21–24), Gorlizki (2002), Hale (2007: 227–250), and Willerton
(1992), especially 230–241.Toka, 1999: 23–24). Soviet society had always been a sup-
plicant to power, in the shape of local party-state satraps,
unable to organize independently of the political system,
and for the most part remained a supplicant even as the old
order decayed and collapsed (Fish, 1995).
The necessary conditions for the creation of patrimonial
capitalism were therefore present at the moment of the
USSR’s demise. The model of economic change and eco-
nomic policy priorities came from outside and was not
strongly supported by any organized social force. This made
calculations about whether to reform and how far complex.
Some level of market reform was inevitable. The market
was to some extent already in existence when the USSR
collapsed as some private economic exchange had ﬁlled the
spaces created by the implosion of the Soviet planned
economy between 1987 and 1991. The question before new
leaders was did they need or want to close the gap between
political and economic change, to develop newpolitical and
economic structures that could counterbalance social and
elite structures left over from the USSR?
There were a variety of answers to this question; each
post-Soviet country’s answer was determined by a combi-
nation of push and pull factors, which between them
determined whether patrimonial capitalism was created
through conﬂict or accommodation. Circumstance – inse-
cure tenure in particular – pushed some leaders to try to
reform and these reforms, particularly those that occurred
in Russia, then pulled other countries into reform to some
extent so that reformwasdoublyexogenously sourced, from
the ‘West’ and fromRussia. But nomatterwhat theorigins of
reform it was generally compromised when it impacted on
the ability of elite members to use reform to their economic
advantage (Hellman,1998). The lack of broad social support
for reform and/or institutional structures for such support
to manifest itself meant that there was little to gainsay this
compromise. Consequently, the beneﬁts of competitive
market capitalism did not accrue to populations as a whole
but to small numbers of people who could use positions
inherited from the antecedent system to their advantage.
Securing advantage through compromising reformrequired
political support. This was easy to secure where political
inﬂuence could be secured through bargainingwith a single
peak institution such as a presidency (aswas the case across
the former USSR), or where there was non-democratic
continuity through the course of reform (as was the case
in much of post-Soviet Central Asia, for example) (Hellman,
1998; Schlumberger 2008). In these cases economic power
became fungible and intertwined with political power and
institutions to create patrimonial capitalism. Consequently,
where there was both economic reform and some political
change what we might call ‘full-spectrum hybridity’
developed as political and economic hybridity combined.
3. Stability and patrimonial capitalism
Patrimonial capitalism develops as a means of coping
with exogenous pressure to change economic practice. Its
form raises questions about longer-term stability because it
constrains development, and because it creates patterns of
intra-elite relations that constrain reform that might lead
to development.
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economically. Its legitimacy is based in the ﬁrst instance on
elite agreement and their acceptance of it as an economic
order: legitimacy ﬂows from other power-holders, not
from the governed as Stinchcome (1987: 150) argued. This
means that there are collective action problems in
achieving development based on economic reform. A social
majority may have a latent interest in development in that
they might gain from it, but they have low incentives to
organize and agitate for reform; they will incur costs if they
do organize and agitate for reform, but will gain from the
public good of economic reform if they free-ride. On the
other hand, losers from change – elite members, those who
enjoyed consumption before policies to create develop-
ment were put in place, have incentives to oppose reform.
Their losses (privileged access to goods and resources etc,
undisturbed consumption) are born directly by them and
outweigh the gains that they would derive from the public
good of reform. Consequently not all states take action and
some that do back down in the face of opposition.5
Obstacles to launching development-orientated reforms
are therefore great (Chaudry, 1993). This enables patrimo-
nial capitalism to achieve political embeddedness as
Schlumberger (2008) puts it. As politics and economic
power become intertwined the political system does not
develop autonomously of the structure of social inequality
in a society: instead the beneﬁciaries of patrimonial capi-
talism achieve a degree of state capture. The state cannot be
a powerful vehicle for economic development as a result,
and private, elite-dominated enterprise will not act as such
a vehicle. At the same time state functions are put under
pressure as resources are diverted from fulﬁlling state
functions to rapacious elite groups. This can impact on
performance legitimacy as the state, resource poor as it is,
can struggle to provide welfare and security. The problems
that state capture and the denial of resources to the state
can cause might be escaped for a time due to circumstance.
High commodity prices, for example, can facilitate growth.
But unless such circumstances lead to a change in the
state’s capacity overall and speciﬁcally in its ability to
create incentives that generate higher productivity and
invest in high value production etc, these problems will
likely resurface in the future. There is, in other words, a
high degree of path dependency that ﬁxes patrimonial
capitalism in place.
How stable patrimonial capitalism is thus depends on
two things. First, it depends on elites being tied to the
patrimonial capitalist system. If there are not enough re-
sources available to both fund the state’s fulﬁlment of its
functions and satisfy elite in place divisions over economic
strategy will ensue and help to cause ruptures in the
compromised polity upon which patrimonial capitalism
rests. Second, there is a ﬁne balance to be struck between
managing society as a whole and distributing resources to
elite groups. Managing society requires that there be
enough resources available for the state to function at some5 On these problems generally see Geddes (1994). On collective action
problems and post-communist economic reform see Przeworski (1991:
162–180) and Hellman (1998).minimal level of security and welfare provision. Channel-
ling resources to elite members can have some welfare
functions as they may pass on a portion of resources that
they acquire. Elite members might also buttress internal
security by using their resources to informally regulate
society by, for example, controlling media. But these spill-
overs from the allocation of resources will not resolve all
welfare needs and will not cover all the domestic and in-
ternational security functions of the state. The danger here
is that the patrimonial system reaches a ﬁscal crisis point:
the amount needed tomaintain patrimony plus the amount
needed to maintain basic state functions may be greater
than the amount that can be appropriated by domestically
or borrowed internationally. Such a crisis need not be
revolutionary, although it can be, of course. Crisis can be
less dramatic than a revolution, some combination of
governmental instability, fresh pressures for reform, invoke
new conditionalities from lenders of last resort etc. Theo-
retically, the form of crisis and its outcomes are immaterial;
the important point is that if such a situation arises then a
country’s patrimonial capitalism can be described as
inherently unstable, rather than tending towards a stable
political economy that recreates elite power over the
economy. At this point political disturbance of some point
may upset not just the hybrid economy but the hybrid
political system as well, pushing it either towards de-
mocracy or to fuller authoritarianism.4. Patrimonial capitalism in the post-Soviet space
From the above we can see that patrimonial capitalism
is stable where there is the possibility of appropriating or
otherwise accumulating resources sufﬁcient to keep
patrimony and state going over a longer term. Stable and
unstable patrimonial capitalisms have been observable in
the former USSR. Patterns of stability have been created by
pressure to modernize, by the construction and stability of
coalitions that support patrimonial capitalism, and by the
underlying economic structures of the post-Soviet states
and the capacity of these structures to support patri-
monialism whilst at the same time maintaining basic state
functions. There is not space here to go through all of these
factors and the forces created by and involved with them,
certainly not for all of the countries in the region that might
be called patrimonial capitalist. What we can do is assess
the roots of patrimonial capitalism, the conditions that
have enabled it to develop and its relationship to reform,
and assess its stability through the prism of the Russian
case in the ﬁrst instance.
Reform in Russia was pressed forward early and in the
face of elite interests because of the weakness of the
Russian government under Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin had been
elected Russian President only in June 1991 and had no
secure political basis for his power. Yeltsin’s authority res-
ted on his break with the communist establishment, mak-
ing him one of only two post-Soviet presidents (outside the
Baltic states) to have broken with Soviet era power struc-
tures. Presidential–parliamentary relations were poorly
established in constitutional law. The writ of the central
Russian government was not well established beyond
N. Robinson / Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 136–145 141Moscow, and there was no presidential party in parliament
(Morgan-Jones, 2010).
Radical economic reform via marketization and trade
liberalization aimed to alter the balance of power between
political authorities and the remnants of Soviet adminis-
trative elites that had not been ousted by the limited
turnover of sub-national political and economic elites
(Johnson & Kroll, 1991; McAuley, 1992). Economic reform
was thus a substitute for political strategy and institution
building in Russia (Robinson, 1999; Woodruff, 1999). The
political gains that reformwas supposed to bring were not,
however, enough to lock reform in place and enable mar-
ketization to change Russian society and the balance of
power therein. Although economic reform was adopted in
outline relatively simply and easily at the end of 1991, it
soon became highly politicised. Reform was opposed by a
wide constituency of managerial, political and social in-
terests – there was even a short-lived alliance of such
forces, Civic Union, between the summer of 1992 and the
spring of 1993 – as well as by a variety of nationalist and
communist groupings. Reform was compromised and
Yeltsin’s attention shifted to political survival. Yeltsin
stitched together shifting coalitions of regional, economic
(including liberals who were necessary to access interna-
tional funds), and political allies to maintain power and
secure his re-election (Shevtsova, 1999). The breadth of
Yeltsin’s alliance building was wide and the loyalty of allies
frequently shallow (Willerton, 1998). This pushed Yeltsin to
‘overinsure’ his power by incorporating as many interests
within his coalition as possible (Breslauer, 2002).
Not surprisingly one effect of this coalition politics was
that economic reform was further weakened. Some mea-
sure of this can be seen in Fig. 2, which shows reformFig. 2. Reform plateaus: banking and competition policy in selected post-Soviet s
(2011).progress in two key areas, competition policy, which we
have linked to patrimonial capitalism above, and banking
policy. Fig. 2 uses the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development’s four-point scale of reform progress,
where a score of four means that reform has been
completed. The development of competition policy has
obvious implications for elite control over economic ac-
tivity in that higher rates of competition will impact elite
incomes from the resources they control. The extent of
banking policy reform correlates to the degree of openness
of the ﬁnancial system and its capacity to promote devel-
opment through the provision of capital etc. Greater
openness in the ﬁnancial system will also mean there are
ﬁnancial services (such as foreign banks, banks that are not
pocket banks) not tied to elite economic interests.
Fig. 2 shows that progress was made immediately after
the collapse of communism in Russia (mostly) and other
post-Soviet states (to some extent) in these key areas. The
rate of change in both competition and banking policy then
slowed: reform generally peaked around 1994–1995. Some
progress was made after 2000, but often unevenly so that
frequently one area developed but the other did not. Nor
was progress constant: backsliding, for example in the
Kazakh banking sector, was commonplace, as one would
expect where reform touched too heavily on elite interests.
The stalled and erratic progress of reformmeant that across
the post-Soviet space practices that allowed unproﬁtable
enterprises to survive at the expense of development
thrived; this was often through the demonetization of
economic exchange through barter and the payment of
wages and taxes in kind. Economic actors either used ac-
cess to local institutions or extant networks of inﬂuence to
maintain production and their power, constraining thetates. Data from EBRD (2000: 176–224), EBRD (2001: 160–209), and EBRD
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institutions for investment (Gaddy & Ickes, 2002). Invest-
ment in the economy plummeted and output contracted.
Overall, across the former Soviet space economic recovery
was slow in the extreme. On average real GDP at the end of
the 1990s was only 54% of what it had been in the last
‘good’ economic year the USSR had, 1989 (Robinson, 2004:
175; Shishkov, 2007).
Economic decline and the weakening of popular per-
formance legitimacy that this caused was offset ﬁrst, by the
fact that some of the suffering could be explained as
necessary readjustment caused by moving from one eco-
nomic system to another. Second, political pressure was
alleviated by the massive redistribution of property in
favour of elites, and by the fact that the failure of reform left
in place Soviet era structures and social dependencies,
which constrained social protest (Ashwin, 1999). Property
redistribution in the hands of elites often consolidated the
latter. It also caused massive inequality so that even as the
economic cake got smaller the elite slice grew: the losses of
transition were passed on to transitional ‘losers’. Economic
power meanwhile was concentrated in the hands of old
economic elite members, who gained from the transfer of
property in mass privatization (Filototchev, Wright, &
Bleaney, 1999). The distribution of property was often, as
one commentator on Ukraine out it, ‘feudal’ in that it
beneﬁtted clan-like structures (Kindzersky, 2010: 124).6
These networks then dominated their subject populations
in a variety of ways. They tied their subjects to them
sometimes by maintaining employment (although not
necessarily paid employment), sometimes with violence,
sometimes because the complexity of the networks made
them difﬁcult to reform, and sometimes because they
portrayed themselves as bulwarks against more chaos
(Gaddy & Ickes, 2002; Nazpary, 2002; van Zon, 2000: 44–
47). The growth of economic inequality was far steeper in
the 1990s in the former USSR than in Eastern Europe where
democratic and economic reforms were mutually sup-
portive (Frye, 2010; Hellman, 1998).
In Russia this pattern of patrimonial capitalist develop-
ment was marked by instability from the start. In 1992–
1993 concessions over privatization broke established
business interests away from political opposition to Yeltsin
to fragment the Civic Union oppositional coalition (Cook &
Gimpelson, 1995). This enabled Yeltsin to isolate and
destroy his political opponents in late 1993. Compromise
and co-option did nothing for the economy, however, and
the economic practices that established business interests
engaged in created a currency crisis in 1994 as state ﬁnances
were put under strain by the shrinking tax base and the
gradual demonetization of the economy. To cope with this,6 Ericson (2000: 15) went so far as to describe the emerging economic
system as a form of ‘industrial feudalism’ in which ‘property and contract
rights are diffuse, circumscribed by Soviet tradition, and encumbered by
conﬂicting claims of multiple stakeholders, rendering them unenforce-
able through regular legal channels. . there is . very little investment
beyond that required to maintain current, reduced levels of activity.
Finally, the sources of political and economic power are localized and
relational, unencumbered by moral or overarching institutional
constraint.’and to build alliances in advance of the 1995–1996 electoral
cycle, a second round of co-option took place. Ties were
developed with banks that helped to forge links to business
empires with major media interests (Pappe & Galukhina,
2009: 45–48). These then paid off in the 1996 presidential
elections (Schröder, 1999: 967–970). Equally importantly
these links had another important stabilizing function
during 1994–1997. The banks brought government short-
term debt, which enabled the state to function at a mini-
mum level. This short-term debt market compensated for
the state’s inability to generate tax revenue and made the
budget deﬁcit manageable (Robinson, 1999: 549). Russian
debt, as can be seen in Fig. 3, rose as a proportion of GDP
from 1994 onwards to peak in 1999. This was not sustain-
able. In the ﬁrst instance, Russian banks did not have the
reserves to fund the state budget indeﬁnitely. Shortly after
the 1996 presidential election their money ran out, and the
government short-term debt market had to be opened to
foreign lenders. Domestic interestswere compensated from
this opening of the debt market since foreigners could only
buy Russian government debt through Russian banks.
Foreign holdings of government debt doubled in 1997 and
allowed the Russian government to rollover the short-term
debts due to domestic bondholders (Robinson, 2009).
The fact that Russia had to turn to foreign lenders in late
1996 to fund its budget deﬁcit highlights that there are
limits to the domestic sources of patrimonial capitalist
stability. The transfer of resources to elite groups eventually
becomes unsustainable and stops the state from main-
taining a minimal level of functionality. This point was
reached quite quickly in Russia due to the collapse of the
Soviet economy and the ﬁnancial demands on the Russian
state, which were considerable given its size, military in-
heritance, and geopolitical position. The turn to foreign
lenders was accompanied by efforts to reform the economy
and improve the domestic tax take, to break away from
patrimonial capitalism in other words. These efforts did not
work and along with the contagion affect of the crisis in
Asian ﬁnancial markets in 1997 brought crisis to Russia in
1998. This was just a prelude, however, to a new stage in
the consolidation of Russian patrimonial capitalism as in
the 2000s Russia was able to replace foreign borrowing
with raised proﬁts and taxes from hydrocarbon sales.
Again, as Fig. 3 shows, as the price of oil (and the price of
gas) rose on global markets Russia’s GDP (shown in an
index of per capita GDP) rose. Control over these windfall
proﬁts was also more evenly split between elites and the
government before as the political fallout of the 1998 crisis
allowed Putin to assert greater political control over the
economy by building up coercive control of economic
agents (Taylor, 2011). As a result, Russia was able to both
pay down its foreign borrowings and build up large re-
serves of foreign currency which were then used to protect
elite-owned industries when the international economic
crisis in late 2008 (Robinson, 2011, 2013). Politically the
result of this was far greater stability. There were no elite
divisions over Putin’s succession in 2008 by Dmitry Med-
vedev, or at least none that came to the surface to disturb
the electoral cycles of 2007–2008, and no such divisions
appeared to signiﬁcantly affect Putin’s resumption of the
presidency in 2011–2012.
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using externally sourced resources was common across the
post-Soviet space, although outcomes varied. The country
with the closest pattern to Russia is Kazakhstan. Pressure in
Kazakhstan (and in some other post-Soviet Central Asian
states) to reform was less than in Russia (Auty & de Soysa,
2006). Reform was compromised by its half-heartedness
and the fact that it was frequently a by-product of
Russian reform, which forced some marketization, the
adoption of new currencies etc, in other post-Soviet states.
Where there was some reform – as in the energy sector in
Kazakhstan – it this was often brought about by the short-
term needs of ruling elites and was not followed through
with wider reforms (Jones Luong & Weinthal, 2001).
Greater control over economic reform, direct beneﬁt from
short-term reform of the energy sector meant that there
was time to put in place political strategies to control elite
competition over resources. Kazakhstan achieved a rela-
tively high degree of compromise over its post-Soviet po-
litical settlement (Jones Luong, 2002). This settlement then
held so that by the time the economic decline and elite
ambition began to impact on stability it was possible to
bind elites to the system politically, through controlled
party development, to head of political crisis in the late
1990s and early 2000s (Isaacs, 2011: 73–76). Thereafter, as
in Russia and as Fig. 3 shows, Kazakhstan enjoyed an oil
boom that raised its GDP, with this income being distrib-
uted through the political channels established to manage
elite conﬂict in the 1990s.
Russian and Kazakhstan both, therefore, secured their
regimes through patrimonial capitalism and accessing re-
sources from the global economy: Russia used debt and
then energy proﬁts, Kazakhstan used reform of the energy
sector and then energy proﬁts. Russia’s debt-based stabi-
lization of the tension between patrimonial capitalism and
the needs of the state to ﬁnance its functions was unstableand in the long run relieved by energy rents. Other post-
Soviet states have not been as fortunate. Debt build-ups
were either not as available or could not be relieved in
these states so that economic problems pilled over into
political instability.
In Ukraine, as we have already mentioned, the division
of property was similar to Russia. Property was initially
distributed to clan-like structures; subsequently a set of
extremely powerful business groups emerged as gas
traders and acquired control of strategic assets. These
groups then developed political power out of their eco-
nomic power. It has been estimated that before the Orange
Revolution 300 out of the 450 deputies in the Supreme
Rada were dollar millionaires and nine business factions
dominated the Rada (Åslund, 2005: 7–8). The presence of a
large number of factions in the Rada was a sign of higher
degree of fragmentation of the Ukrainian elite in compar-
ison to Russia (Way, 2005: 194–195). As in Russia, the level
of social inequality that the combination of economic and
political power produced was very high. Growth in the
economy was repressed, as Fig. 2 shows. This was in part
because a main source of rent transfers to Ukrainian elites
was from locational rents accrued from energy transit from
Russia to Europe. These rents funded the rise of Ukraine’s
oligarchs whilst the reduced prices charged by Russia for its
energy helped to fund unproﬁtable industrial production
and keep some Ukrainian exports saleable on world mar-
kets (van Zon, 2000: 113, 117).
From the late 1990s these sources of rent were supple-
mented by foreign borrowing as Fig. 2 shows. The major
build-ups came after 2002 in the run-up to the 2004 elec-
tions. Competition over rents became ﬁerce since accessing
rent from both energy transit and foreign borrowing was
dependenton accessingpolitical power. Access to rent could
not be maintained for all elite groups. Borrowing, and the
distribution of rent, had to be controlled since there was a
N. Robinson / Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 136–145144ﬁscal crisis as the state under pressure because of a persis-
tent budget deﬁcit (on average Ukraine ran a government
deﬁcit of 5.2% of GDP between 1992 an 2010). Rent
struggles therefore spilled over into politics as politics and
corruption governed access to rent (Way, 2005: 196–197).
Divisions within the elite were a major contributory factor
to the division that surfaced in the 2004 elections inUkraine
that led to, and underpinned the Orange Revolution
(Åslund, 2006). As D’Anieri (2006) has argued, these di-
visions were crucial to the success of that revolution; in
their absence previous street protests and electoral mobi-
lization had failed. After the Orange Revolution the growth
of foreign borrowing and debt continued, in large part since
there was a perception that Ukraine under new political
management should be supported and would reform. Re-
form was not, however, forthcoming thanks to political
inﬁghting and opposition. Ukraine was therefore unable to
break out of its cycle of political instability and debt, instead
of funding reconstruction, became a liability that plunged
Ukraine deep into crisis after 2008. This then led to another
change of government in 2010, when the electoral results of
2005 were reversed.
A similar story can be told of in Kyrgyzstan. At inde-
pendence Kyrgyzstan had a president, Askar Akaev, from
without Soviet era power structures. Akaev, like Yeltsin, had
an incentive to reform to balance out the power of economic
and political elite members. However, radical economic
reformwas inimical to regional leaders (Jones Luong, 2002:
115–117). Their opposition to reform and ability to block its
implementation forced Akaev to compromise. This
compromisewas stabilized through the division of property
between regional and central leaders, and also by the
funding of the economy through the build-up of high levels
of debt. As Fig. 3 shows, Kyrgyz GDPhardly grewat all but its
debt levels rocketed across the 1990s. These borrowings,
alongwith cheap energy fromRussia, basically replaced the
Soviet subsidies to the Kyrgyz budget so that at least the
country did not suffer the fate of Tajikistan, where civil war
broke out in 1992 as state ﬁnances collapsed. The build-up
of debt was, however, unsustainable. In the absence of re-
form Kyrgyzstan was not able to restructure or develop its
industry, and its relative geographic isolationmeant that its
agriculture could not develop as a strong exporting sector.
Like Ukraine, intra-elite struggles, this time fuelled by
North-South divisions and inequitable division of resources,
began to organized around the electoral cycle and led to a
change of government in the 2005 ‘Tulip Revolution’ (Ó
Beacháin, 2009). This change was not as stable as
Ukraine’s, however, since legal authorities didnotmediate it
to produce compromise. The revolution led to property
redistribution in favour of Southern elites favoured by the
new president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, at the expense of
Northern factions associated with Akaev (Sokolov &
Sarygulov, 2010: 146). Although there was some economic
recovery after 2005, a stable institutional structure and elite
bargain did not emerge to consolidate power even tempo-
rarily. External resources ﬂowed in through loans from
Russia and from remittance payments, but these resources
were not enough (or not lootable being held by too many
people) to compensate for a lack of political agreement and
Bakiyev was removed in 2010 in a second ‘revolution’.5. Conclusion
The experiences of Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and
Kyrgyzstan all show that the stability of economic hybrids
is dependent on their ability to access income from abroad
whether it be in the form of loans or energy rents. When
such income was scarce economic hybrids face domestic
political struggles as elite groups clashed with each other
and with state ofﬁcials over resource distribution. These
clashes need not bring a regime down, but they may alter
the balance of power. In Russia they led to a recapturing of
government by state ofﬁcials under Putin and to a more
authoritarian variant of political hybridity. In Ukraine they
led to government turnover but did not foster political or
economic stability. In Kazakhstan the threat of struggle led
to a deepening of institutional supports for Nazarbayev,
which were then consolidated by oil rents. In Kyrgyzstan
economic misfortune and political upheaval fed off one
another throughout the period 2005–2010 and led to two
violent changes in leader.
Obviously the conclusions that we can draw from this
small set of cases are limited. However, they do show that
there is a difﬁculty reconciling hybrid political arrangements
with economic hybridity when that hybridity takes a form
like patrimonial capitalism, where the form of capitalism is
created as much by external pressure as by the organic
development of a country’s economy, and where there are
constraints on economic development because of rapacious
elite behaviours. Where this is the case and at best, stability
might be preserved long enough through inﬂows of re-
sources for state ofﬁcials interested in development to gain
the upper hand, or for processes of modernization to work
through and tip the scale in favour of the democratic aspect
of hybridity. Given the inherent instability of such systems,
however, this best-case scenario will, unfortunately, prob-
ably only work out in very few countries.References
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